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enables comparative, explanatory empirical assessments of regulatory impacts. 
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1  Introduction 
 „‘egulatioŶ is haƌd to defiŶe, Ŷot least ďeĐause it ŵeaŶs different things to different people.͞ (Levi-
Faur 2011a: 3). 
This essay clarifies the notions of regulation and self-regulation in Political Science. Since 
the 1970s, the regulatory state has emerged not least as a response to increasingly com-
plex and transboundary policy problems in the vein of international competition and 
economic and monetary integration (Majone 1994, 1997, 1999a, b). The rich extant lit-
erature concurs regarding the extraordinary and increasing importance of regulation 
(Braithwaite et al. 2007; Jordana/Levi-Faur 2004). Concurrently, a notable diversity of 
understandings of what regulation means has emerged (Baldwin et al. 2012; Döh-
ler/Wegrich 2010). This diversity is not least a result of the proliferation of modes of 
regulation and governance in the vein of economic modernization, globalization and the 
move beyond traditional forms of state intervention. The spread of regulation and self-
regulation leads to an increased relevance of this research for policy analysis as well as 
the study of international relations whenever such studies put strategies of problem-
solving at the forefront. Simultaneously, however, these strands of literature have de-
veloped rather sepaƌatelǇ, aŶd the teƌŵ ͞ƌegulatioŶ͟ still evokes a bureaucratic conno-
tation that no longer seems justified. Against this background, this article reviews the 
literature on regulation and self-regulation along three main analytic questions (Levi-
Faur 2011a): First, what is being regulated? Second, who regulates? Thirds, how does 
regulation take place? 
 On this basis three understandings of regulation can be identified, which put differ-
ent emphasis on the role of the state and the fact that regulation denotes both a set of 
instruments and a process. The focus on regulatory instruments defines regulation nar-
rowly as a mode of state intervention and focuses on the intersection of regulation with 
administrative actors as well as its instrumental forms. More process-oriented perspec-
tives tend to view regulation more broadly as a specific way of structuring and resolving 
political and economic conflicts in order to shape decision-making processes and their 
results and involve both political and non-political actors. They have been extended to 
include private, sometimes voluntary, modes of (self-ͿƌegulatioŶ ďeǇoŶd, Ǉet ͞iŶ the 
shadoǁ of͟ the state. 
                                                     
1 I am very grateful to Christian Ewert, Jale Tosun and Paul Verbruggen for their helpful comments and 
literature recommendations. 
 This study was funded within the framework or the research of the "Field of Focus 4 – Selbst-Regula-
tioŶ uŶd ‘egulatioŶ: IŶdiǀidueŶ uŶd OƌgaŶisatioŶeŶ͞ aŶd ďǇ the “ǁiss NatioŶal “Đience Foundation, 
project number 162077. 
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The next section outlines different understandings of regulation. On this basis, a short 
overview of the emergence and different types of regulation and their objects – the 
͞ǁhat͟ – follows. Subsequently, actor-centeƌed defiŶitioŶs foĐusiŶg oŶ ͞ǁho͟ ƌegulates 
will be presented. This enables an identification of different regulatory techniques as 
well as modes of self-regulation – the ͞hoǁ͟. The concluding section discusses comple-
mentarities between different notions of regulation, as well as research gaps resulting 
from modern understandings of regulation. 
2 Three meanings of regulation 
Political Science generally understands regulation as a way of steering behavior. Origi-
nally, regulation primarily meant the setting of rules (Levi-Faur 2011a). Contemporary 
understandings view regulation as a way of addressing the question of „ǁho gets ǁhat, 
ǁheŶ, aŶd hoǁ͞ ;Lassǁell ϮϬϭϮͿ. This entails activities concerning the processes of a) 
agenda-setting and decision-making, b) adoption and implementation, c) monitoring 
compliance, d) enforcement and a) evaluation and review (Abbott/Snidal 2009: 44; 
Hood et al. 2001; Levi-Faur 2011a; Verbruggen/Havinga 2017). Although regulation is 
often presented as a clearly confined governmental activity, at least three meanings of 
regulation can be distinguished according to Baldwin et al. (2012) and Jordana/Levi-Faur 
(2004). TheǇ diffeƌ ŶotaďlǇ iŶ the ďƌeadth ǁith ǁhiĐh theǇ defiŶe the ͞ǁhat͞, ͞ǁho͟ aŶd 
͞hoǁ͟, ǁhile ofteŶ Ŷot ďeiŶg ĐleaƌlǇ deŵaƌĐated theŵselǀes. The discussion of the in-
volved actors here is confined to the regulating actors in a more narrow sense (phases 
a, c and d). 
2.1 Regulation as state intervention 
In the Weberian sense regulation is understood as a the promulgation of an authorita-
tive set of rules, accompanied by some mechanism for monitoring and promoting com-
pliance, typically through a public agency specifically assigned to this task (Jordana/Levi-
Faur 2004; Töller 2011). Lowi (1972), for example, defines regulation as a specific way 
how the state controls society. Regulation aims at influencing human behavior and op-
pressing undesired behavior, by setting out conditions and restrictions of individual and 
collective behavior. Thus, regulation is primarily an instrument. As such it is distinct from 
distributional and redistributive policy aimed at extracting and allocating resources be-
tween societal actors. In this vein, Selznick (1985) defines regulation as the sustained 
and focused control exercised by a public authority over activities that are valued by the 
community. 
2.2 Regulation as governance 
In a broader, more process-oriented sense, regulation generally denotes governance as 
the ensemble of the targeted – both restricting and enabling – aggregated efforts 
through which state agencies exercise influence in order to steer social and economic 
behavior. This includes binding rules as well as other, less compulsory forms on influ-
ence, based on economic incentives, contractually assigned tasks and competences, 
public ownership or the use of resources. This understanding partly underlies MajoŶe͛s 
(1994, 1999a, ďͿ ŶotioŶ of the ͞ƌegulatoƌǇ state͟. The regulatory state corrects market 
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failures by steering (that is, rules), ďut delegatiŶg the ͞ƌoǁiŶg͟ – that is, the concretiza-
tion and implementation of these rules (phases b-d) – to a range of state and non-state 
actors at various levels: national, regional, local, individual (Yeung 2010).2 It succeeds 
the positive, interventionist welfare state of the postwar era and increasingly manifests 
itself also in the international arena beyond the traditional nation state 
(Braithwaite/Drahos 2000; Jordana/Levi-Faur 2004; Kerwer 2005; Koppell 2010; Majone 
1997; Tosun 2012b). Yet the delegating regulatory state eventually retains the respon-
sibility to safeguard the public interest (Bendor et al. 2001). It does so by means of for-
malized and rigid as well as less binding, negotiation-based control mechanisms (Yeung 
2010). Levi-Faur (2011a: 6), however, distinguishes regulation from other binding 
norms, including legislative and judicial rule-making, when defining ƌegulatioŶ as the ͟ eǆ 
ante bureaucratic legalization of prescriptive rules and the monitoring and enforcement 
of these rules by social, business, and political actors on other social, business, and po-
litiĐal aĐtoƌs͟. 
 Both Levi-Fauƌ͛s aŶd MajoŶe͛s defiŶitioŶs ĐoƌƌespoŶd to the seĐoŶd ŵeaŶiŶg of ƌeg-
ulation regarding the questions of who regulates and what is being regulated. Yet they 
ĐoŶĐeiǀe of ƌegulatoƌǇ teĐhŶiƋues ;the ͞hoǁ͟Ϳ ŵoƌe ŶaƌƌoǁlǇ, siŶĐe theǇ deŵaƌĐate 
regulation from redistributive and, in the case of Levi-Faur, non-binding rules 
(Braithwaite et al. 2007). 
2.3 Regulation as mechanisms of social control 
The most recent and broadest meaning of regulation moves beyond the idea that it is 
the state who regulates. In this sense, regulation encompasses all mechanisms of social 
control that aim at social or economic influence (phases a-e) – independently of whether 
they come from the state or other sources, such as the market. Rooted in the theory of 
smart regulation (Gunningham et al. 1998), this understanding of regulation emerges, 
on the one hand, from the insight that steering can equally have its origin in non-state 
institutions, including businesses and self-regulating, professional, voluntary and trade 
organizations. On the other hand, this understanding of regulation no longer presumes 
that the effects of regulation are intended. They can equally be a side effect of pursuing 
other goals. As a consequence, regulation also includes mechanisms that are neither the 
product of state activities nor part of an institutional arrangement, for instance, the de-
velopment of social norms and the effects of markets in modifying behavior (Levi-Faur 
2011a). This de-centered view of regulation paved the way for the discovery of a pleth-
ora of non-state regulatory actors (e.g. Büthe 2010; Graz/Nölke 2008; Vogel 2008) and 
alternative, for instance voluntary, cooperative or network-based, modes of regulation 
(e.g. Ayres/Braithwaite 1994; Coen/Thatcher 2005; Héritier/Eckert 2008, 2009; Levi-
Faur 2011b; Töller 2011; Tosun et al. 2016) – including self-regulation characterized by 
                                                     
2 Jordana and Levi-Fauƌ ;ϮϬϬ4Ϳ attƌiďute MajoŶe͛s ƌegulatoƌǇ state to the most narrow meaning of reg-
ulation. This aptly illustrates the fuzziness of the conceptual distinction of different notions of regula-
tion (see Black 2002 and Knill/Tosun 2012). Majone (1994, 1996) indeed describes the regulatory state 
as a reaction to and shift away from redistributive welfare and macroeconomic policy and public own-
ership toward behavioral steering. Yet the trends toward delegation, privatization, third-party gov-
ernment, promotion of competition and not directly binding rules he depicts are much more charac-
teristic of the second, rather than the first meaning of regulation, and certainly greatly exceed tradi-
tional command and control approaches. 
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an (almost) complete retreat of the state (Knill/Lehmkuhl 2002; Knill/Tosun 2012). It also 
foresees the possibility that the state is being regulated by civil society, rather than vice 
versa. This meaning mostly resonates with “Đott͛s ;ϮϬϬ1: 283) definition of regulation as 
͞aŶǇ pƌoĐess oƌ set of pƌoĐesses ďǇ ǁhich norms are established, the behavior of those 
subject to the norms monitored or fed back into the regime, and for which there are 
mechanisms for holding the behavior of regulated actors within the acceptable limits of 
the ƌegiŵe͟. 
 Table 1 resumes the three notions of regulation, illustrating that these only partially 
overlap. The more society-centered understandings of regulation, for instance, repre-
sent efforts to overcome traditional modes of state regulation in order to respond to 
changed power structures, new policy problems and societal changes (Majone 1997). 
The discussions surrounding regulation and deregulation, in turn, often refer to the 
question of what the state should or should not prescribe to businesses and civil society 
(Levi-Faur 2011a). Clearly, the discussions of analytic and normative aspects of regula-
tion in the literature can only be understood against the background of the underlying 
understanding of regulation (Döhler/Wegrich 2010). 
Table 1: Three meanings of regulation 
Under-
standing 
What is being regula-
ted? Who regulates? 
How are things being reg-
ulated? 
Regulation 
as state in-
tervention 
Individual and collec-
tive behavior 
Phases a, c and d:  
State 
Intentional, prescriptive 
conditions and constraints 
Excludes (re)distribution 
of resources 
Regulation 
as gover-
nance 
Individual and collec-
tive behavior; market 
and state failure 
Phase a:  
State und state-like 
actors (national and 
transnational)  
Phases b – d: delega-
tion 
Intentional, prescriptive 
and non-binding, con-
straining and enabling 
Includes (re)distribution of 
resources 
Regulation 
as mecha-
nisms of so-
cial control 
Individual and collec-
tive, social and eco-
nomic behavior 
Phases a-d:  
State and non-state 
actors (business, civil 
society) 
Intentional and uninten-
tional, prescriptive and 
non-binding, constraining 
and enabling 
Includes (re)distribution of 
resources and soft norms 
Source: Own illustration based on Jordana/Levi-Faur 2004 and Baldwin et al. 2012. 
In what follows, varieties of regulation are discussed more in depth according to three 
guiding questions: what is being regulated, who regulates, and how is it being regulated? 
3 What is being regulated? 
The transition toward the regulatory state was first highlighted in the Anglo-Saxon (Mo-
ran 2003; Seidman/Gilmour 1986; Wilson 1980) and later in the West European context 
(Majone 1994, 1997, 1999a, b). After the restoration of the national economies in the 
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aftermath of World War II, the positive, Keynesian welfare state acted as a planner, di-
rect producer of goods and services, and employer whose priorities were income redis-
tribution and macroeconomic stabilization by means of taxes and public spending. Yet 
reinforced international competition, the economic and monetary integration within 
the European Union (EU), rising levels of unemployment and inflation rates raised 
doubts about this social democratic model. Nearly unlimited public expenditures as well 
as generous welfare policies were increasingly perceived as an important cause of the 
weak economy (Yeung 2010). 
3.1 The regulatory state: response to market failure 
Contrary to this state-centric view of regulation, the regulatory state tended to retreat 
from these tasks and focus more strongly on market regulation instead. The rule-setting 
regulatory state, acting both as external and market regulator as well as an internal reg-
ulator of a decentralized bureaucracy, is a development to be observed all over the 
globe since the 1970s (Jordana/Levi-Faur 2004). Majone (1997) names three reasons in 
the West European context. The privatization of public ownership required new possi-
bilities for control. Europeanization induced a transfer of regulatory competences away 
from the nation state to the EU, which acts itself as a regulatory state delegating tasks 
to member states. The new regulatory state manifests itself at the national, regional and 
global level (Jordana/Levi-Faur 2004; Yeung 2010). Finally, the transition from state gov-
ernment to indirect or third party government occurred through four mechanisms: the 
decentralization and regionalization of bureaucracy; the formation of specialized admin-
istrative units acting under their own budget; the delegation of responsibility for services 
to private, non-profit or for-profit organizations operating outside the realm of the ex-
ecutive; and the tendering of tasks and services on a contractual basis. 
 Thus, the regulatory state operates through market liberalization, competition, sup-
ply-side economics, far-reaching welfare reforms, New Public Management – oriented 
administrative reforms, and deregulation by means of more efficient, less control-ori-
ented and interventionist methods (Mayntz 2010). As a consequence, the state no 
longer provides welfare and other services directly, but delegates them to a network of 
commercial and non-profit providers instead (Yeung 2010). 
 It is a central task of the regulatory state to correct market failures (as well as the 
failure of the positive state to effectively respond to these) through directives and the 
promotion of competition (Senn 2010). Market failures have several causes. First, mar-
ket transactions create externalities that can cause costs or an insufficient provision of 
public goods. Second, some participants in market transactions may have insufficient 
information at their disposal (information asymmetries). Third, distortions of competi-
tion result from a lack of alternatives on the demand or offer side (monopolies). The first 
two variants of market failure lead to social regulation, for instance in the areas of 
health, safety, environmental or consumer protection regulation. In this context, 
Scharpf (1997) distinguishes between product regulations and process regulations. ͞‘isk 
ƌegulatioŶ͟ ƌefeƌs ŵoƌe ŶaƌƌoǁlǇ to ƌegulatoƌǇ aĐtiǀities to ŵiŶiŵize ƌisks (Hood et al. 
2001; Tosun 2012b). Conversely, distortions of competition lead to economic regulation, 
for instance through price controls. Furthermore, regulation can serve to correct for the 
costs of transactions or coordination, or for the shortcomings of private law (Jor-
dana/Levi-Faur 2004: 32). 
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3.2 Types of regulatory policies 
Jordana and Levi-Faur (2004: 6–8) identify four kinds of regulation relating to competi-
tion. Deregulation refers to scenarios in which the state retreats from regulatory activi-
ties and reduces public expenditures. Thereby, economic, political and social constraints 
of the behavior of social and economic actors are removed. Hence, deregulation is an 
economic-political instrument that refers to the those measures, decided upon by law 
or through agreements between organizations, economic associations and the state, 
which aim at reducing barriers to entering and exiting markets (Schmidt 2004: 153). De-
regulated competition eventually leads to self-regulating markets. From a neoliberal 
viewpoint, regulation is a threat to economic growth and the functioning of markets. Yet 
market mechanisms do not always produce the desired results. They are influenced by 
non-economic factors. Furthermore, even privatization programs depend on public 
steering. Thus, whereas deregulation is sometimes deemed a necessary condition for 
competition (Stigler 1974), the regulation literature emphasizes the necessity for rereg-
ulation alongside liberalization. Competition is steered through regulation and adminis-
trative controls. 
 Regulation-of-competition occurs via national or supranational competition author-
ities that take on broad responsibility for overseeing the economy, for instance in order 
to prevent monopolies or cross-ownerships. Regulation-for-competition intervenes 
more strongly in specific sectors of the economy. Sector-specific specialized regulatory 
authorities proactively participate in shaping and controlling the market (for instance, 
network regimes in the telecommunication sector). Finally, meta-regulated competition 
refers to regulating the process of regulation itself. This induces an enforced self-regu-
lation of competition rules. Both sector-specific and national public competition author-
ities oversee the procedures through which corporations and other organizations set 
rules upon themselves and self-monitor the compliance and enforcement of these rules 
(Morgan 2003; Parker 2007). 
 Today, regulation pervades a broad variety of policy fields. It can serve the preven-
tion of social or ecological risks relating to contemporary developments such as environ-
mental pollution or new technologies (genetic engineering, nuclear energy, data privacy 
in the internet, etc.), cost control, the protection of market competition or private inter-
ests (Döhler/Wegrich 2010). Levi-Faur (2011a: 9–10) identifies eight aspects that are 
regulated independently of the policy sector under question. Entry regulation deter-
mines who is able to offer services, supply products or offer information (e.g. licenses). 
Regulation on behavior deals with issues of proper action, speech, or expression (e.g. 
prohibitions). Regulation of costs targets the acceptable costs of services and products, 
for instance by means of price caps or rates of return. The regulation of content deals 
with the integrity of contents that are communicated through various platforms, such 
as advertisement rules or antiracism norms for the internet, radio and print media. The 
regulation of preferences is manifested via socialization, professionalization, and educa-
tional processes. Regulation of technology refers to prescribing specific technologies of 
production or process. Finally, the regulation of performance targets the achievements 
of results (for example: output goals). 
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4 Who regulates? 
Political scientists mostly answer the question of how regulation takes place by looking 
at the actors involved in these processes. In what follows, the role of the bureaucracy in 
regulation, the delegation of regulatory tasks, and global and private regulating actors 
are discussed. This sets the ground for actor-centered definitions of regulation, and il-
lustrates the latteƌ͛s iŶheƌeŶt hǇďƌiditǇ. 
4.1 The regulating bureaucracy 
State-centered conceptions of regulation focus on bureaucratic and administrative rule 
making and implementation (Levi-Faur 2011a; Selznick 1985). Döhler (2006) highlights 
the particularities of the regulating bureaucracy. While the legislative retains a design 
mandate, the bureaucratic legislator – essentially, the executive – sets its own regula-
tory standards by means of administrative measures and negotiated rulemaking. Insti-
tutioŶallǇ speakiŶg, the ƌegulatiŶg ďuƌeauĐƌaĐǇ steeƌs ͞at distaŶĐe͟ fƌoŵ deŵoĐƌatiĐ 
principals. It is typically disaggregated to different actors at various horizontal and ver-
tical levels. Its procedural legitimacy stems from its subordination to indirectly elected 
ministers responsible for its portfolio, its staffing with specialized experts, and autono-
mous action. Oftentimes, the addressees are involved in consultative processes when 
regulations are set. Acting in sectors with a strong economic or technical momentum, 
regulatory administrative agencies strongly base their decisions on scientific and tech-
nical expertise (Döhler 2006: 208). As a consequence, their attachment to primary law 
decreases, while their discretion increases. 
 The implementation and enforcement of regulation (phased b to d), in turn, is the 
task of executive agents, such as member state authorities, inspectorates and public 
servants (Carter 2017; Lipsky 1980/2010; Lytton/McAllister 2014; May/Wood 2003; 
Thomann 2015b). The high diversity of executive bureaucracy is not least due to differ-
ent degrees of institutional separation of regulatory and enforcement competences, 
which can be more or less centralized. Next to generic and specialized enforcement 
agencies, constellations in which several implementing agencies with different speciali-
zations and expertise share tasks within an organizational network are also increasingly 
common (Fischer et al. 2012; Knill/Tosun 2012; Levi-Faur 2011b). 
4.2 Delegation of regulatory tasks 
Through the rise of the regulatory state, the landscape of actors has changed with an 
increased delegation of regulatory tasks to specialized, autonomous agencies and com-
missions. These actors both have a strong expertise in their respective regulatory area, 
and they operate at aƌŵ͛s leŶgth fƌoŵ goǀeƌŶŵeŶt (Pollitt/Talbot 2004). In this context, 
Coen and Thatcher (2005) speak of Non-Majoritarian Regulators. These are actors who 
are neither elected nor belong to a governmental organization. They were given the 
power to regulate the market, either through formal delegation under public law or a 
de jure or de facto recognition by public authorities. This development is a direct re-
sponse to the particular demands of steering, which independent central banks, regula-
tory agencies or supranational authorities like the European Commission can arguably 
better meet than the traditional centralized bureaucracy. The so-called agency model is 
especially suited for social and economic regulation and other administrative activities 
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where technical expertise, reputation and the ability for credible political commitments 
are decisive for effective regulation (Majone 1997, 1999b). 
 A typical example of this are independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) such as the Ger-
man Federal Network Agency, the European Environment Agency or the U.S. Food and 
Drug Administration, all founded on a legal basis. IRAs have legislative competences, but 
they are not subject to ministerial directions or oversight (Burton 1997; Gilardi 2008; 
Maggetti 2012). Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organizations (Quangos) are 
more generally quasi-autonomous commissioned agencies under private law, publicly 
funded, partially privatized and outsorced organizations or voluntary associations. They 
spend public money, fulfill public tasks (services, counselling, regulation) and have some 
autonomy (Bertelli 2006). Finally, judicial law has gained a more central role and with it, 
courts such as the European Court of Justice. The same is true for pluralistic expert as-
sociations such as employer associations and unions (Majone 1994, 1997; Yeung 2010). 
4.3 Global regulation 
The rise of the regulatory state is not least a consequence of economic modernization 
and globalization (Majone 1999b). Increasingly worldwide interdependencies between 
economies and financial markets led to intensified global interaction that created the 
need for more regulation at the international level. The need for coordination typically 
does not stop at national borders and often urges for prompt solutions (Büthe 2010). 
Within this development toward global, transnational regulation, nation states switched 
their role from a regulating actor to an addressee of regulation. This has led to an erosion 
of the power of nation states and their democratic institutions in favor of an increased 
power of global business actors. Besides the state, a host of new regulatory actors enter 
the stage. These actors are, on the one hand, international organization such as the EU, 
the World Bank or the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD). On the other hand, economic associations (e.g. chambers of commerce), corpo-
rations (e.g. Monsanto), international and national non-governmental organizations 
(e.g. Consumers International), the public (e.g. media) and epistemic communities (e.g. 
scientific expert groups) play an increasingly central role (Braithwaite/Drahos 2000). 
Hale and Held (2011: 12–17) identify five types of transnational regulation. In transgov-
ernmental networks, national proponents of politics and public administration gather 
and coordinate their actions. Arbitration bodies arbitrate transboundary conflicts be-
tween businesses, investors and states. Multi-stakeholder initiatives are partnerships 
between different groups of stakeholders that seek to resolve concrete problems or pro-
vide a service. Voluntary regulations define voluntary conducts and practices, whose ap-
plication is often promoted through persuasive instruments. Finally, finance mecha-
nisms aim at generating or redistributing resources. International cooperation has dif-
ferent degrees of formalization, target groups and geographical scopes (Knill/Tosun 
2012). It emerges in a broad range of policy areas – for example, the regulation of finan-
cial markets, labor standards, nuclear energy, telecommunication, narcotics, food 
safety, maritime and road traffic, air transportation, security, trade, competition and 
environmental policy (Braithwaite/Drahos 2000). 
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4.4 Private regulation 
Economic globalization has led to an increase in the number of businesses acting across 
borders, their practical significance and influence. State mechanisms often proved inef-
fective to govern global corporations and markets and resolve the resulting problems 
(Knill/Lehmkuhl 2002). Market liberalization and product innovation call for regulation, 
yet national governments often lack the necessary expertise (Büthe 2010). Concurrently, 
non-state actors are increasingly involved (Vogel 2008).This included firms and industrial 
associations regulating themselves through codes of conducts; non-governmental or-
ganizations that propose voluntary standards (e.g. fair trade) for businesses; and organ-
izations that include a variety of interest groups from the economic, non-governmental 
and public spheres in the drafting and enforcement of business codes (Abbott/Snidal 
2009). 
 Private regulation denotes binding and non-binding codes, rules and standards that 
are neither decided nor enforced by the state (Börzel/Risse 2010; Senn 2010). It is often 
mentioned alongside inter-, transnational and global regulation, but it is not conceptu-
ally equivalent (Graz/Nölke 2008; Vogel 2008). At the international level, private regula-
tion is to be demarcated from regulation within international treaties and organizations, 
intergovernmental cooperation or national or regional public institutions. Private regu-
lation emerges either within a transnational standard-setting institution, or it results 
from often competing standards of selected businesses and consortiums (Büthe/Mattli 
2011). 
 Private regulation can either follow a logic of control based on compulsory rules, 
enforcement of compliance and incentives. Alternatively, it follows a logic of empower-
ment, which yields the support of marginalized and disadvantaged actors and improves 
their market position by means of cooperation, persuasion and networked advocacy 
(Auld et al. 2015). Private regulation often focuses on a specific industry or product, pro-
cess, performance or working conditions. Areas of application include child labor, coffee 
production or environmental protection in forestry, the energy industry or mineral ex-
traction (Vogel 2008). Some private regulatory regimes operate outside of public scru-
tiny, others, for example international rating agencies, have a high visibility and influ-
ence (Büthe 2010). Private regulation is attractive whenever state sovereignty is an ob-
stacle for decision-making or subsequent processes. It often complements, rather than 
replaces, public regulation. It is especially pronounced in areas that cannot adequately 
be regulated within national borders and whose complexity – technical, or in terms of 
actors – transcends the competences of national authorities. The regulation of food 
safety is a well-researched example (Verbruggen 2013). 
 Even in private regulation, however, the state can play an advisory or supporting role 
– or even be its target (Verbruggen 2013). Multi-stakeholder initiatives that link the 
global certification of products and producers with requirements for an independent 
supervision of suppliers, for instance, have a quasi-public character as they emerge in 
negotiations between corporations, national governments, nongovernmental organiza-
tions or labor unions (Bartley 2007; Cashore et al. 2004). The demand for private regu-
lation can come from participants of market transactions as well as states. For instance, 
the delegation of tasks to private actors, who are sometimes supported with public 
funds, is a core strategy of the EU in the area of technical harmonization and standards 
(Büthe 2010). The World Trade Organization requires governments to comply with 
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standards that were developed by private standards developing organizations: the In-
ternational Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical 
Commission. Additionally, private regulatory actors often rely on public support for 
monitoring and enforcement (Büthe 2010; Graz/Nölke 2008; Verbruggen 2013). 
 Private regulations differ in how they include stakeholders and compete with other 
regulations (Fransen/Kolk 2007). In multi-stakeholder standards, the interests of all con-
cerned actors are represented, membership and participation is open to all actors, and 
several parties engage in their implementation. In contrast, business-centered stand-
ards represent only businesses, the stakeholders cannot be a member or participate, 
and the companies themselves carry out and review the standards. Market-based pri-
vate regulation establishes itself through a competition of rival rules, whereas nonmar-
ket-based private regulation is set by a private institution whose primacy as already ac-
cepted by the addressees (Büthe/Mattli 2011). 
4.5 Actor-centered definitions 
Abbott and Snidal (2009: 44) highlight alteƌŶatiǀe ŵodes of ƌegulatioŶ „aďoǀe͟ aŶd ͞ďe-
loǁ͟ the state. This ƌesults iŶ a tƌiaŶgle of state aĐtoƌs, Điǀil soĐietǇ aŶd ďusiŶess aĐtoƌs 
who jointly or alone take over regulatory tasks in phases a c and d, see Figure 1 
(Börzel/Risse 2010). 
Figure 1: The Governance Triangle 
 
Source: Adapted from Abbott/Snidal (2009). 
The vertex triangles (zones 1-3) refer to situations in which one or several of these actors 
adopt and implement regulatory standards largely on their own, with only modest par-
ticipation, if any, from actors of other types. In zones 4-6, actors of two groups share 
substantial regulatory responsibilities. Zone 7 involves actors from all three spheres. 
 Although the governance triangle offers a useful heuristic, it does not consider the 
object of regulation. Levi-Faur (2011a) fills this gap when asking who regulates whom. 
This leads him to distinguish three forms of regulation. Under first-party regulation, the 
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regulating actor is also the addressee: the main mode of regulatory control is self-regu-
lation. This happens in zones 1, 2 and 3, but it is especially common in zone 2 when 
business actors regulate themselves. So-called self-regulatory associations combine reg-
ulatory functions with the institutional and legal structure and interests of a private ac-
tor (Black 1996). Second-party regulation foresees a social, political, economic and ad-
ministrative division of labor where the regulating actor is independent of and distinct 
from the regulatee. Examples include the state regulation of business (zone 1), but also 
the business regulation of business (zone 2); for instance, when supermarkets set stand-
ards of food production, processing and marketing to producers. In third-party regula-
tion, the relations between the regulator and the addressee are mediated by a third 
party, for example, an independent or semi-independent regulatory-auditor (e.g. Lyt-
ton/McAllister 2014; zones 1-7). 
4.6 Hybrid regulation 
Modern modes of regulation are almost inherently hybrid because all three groups of 
actors – the regulator, the third party and the regulatee – can be state, market, civil 
society actors or combinations thereof (Levi-Faur 2011a: 9; Ewert/Maggetti 2016). Hy-
bridity has several dimensions (Verbruggen/Havinga 2017): first, it means that actors 
from distinct societal spheres are involved into regulation, with diverging rationalities 
and problem definitions. Second, these actors can simultaneously take on several roles 
in the above mentioned regulatory processes (Sager et al. 2014). Third, hybridity some-
times refers to the combination of several regulatory approaches – both first-, second- 
and third-party regulation (Sidney 2008). Hence, even private regulation, typically being 
embedded in existing state institutions and rules, often displays a high degree of hybrid-
ity (e.g. multi-stakeholder standards; Cauld et al. 2015). 
 Levi-Faur (2011a: 10) identifies for types of hybrid regulation. In co-regulation, the 
regulator and the regulatee share the responsibility for the design (phases a and b) and 
the enforcement (phases c and d) of regulation. Cooperative techniques, like public-pri-
vate partnerships, are often used. Second, in enforced self-regulation the regulator com-
pels the regulatee to write a set of rules which the regulator would then either approve 
or send back for revision (Ayres/Braithwaite 1992). Here, the regulatee internalizes the 
costs and duties associated with rule enforcement. Conversely, in meta-regulation the 
addressee sets the rules himself; the regulator contends himself with institutionalizing 
and supervising the integrity of the institutions designed for these processes (Parker 
2007). Finally, multilevel regulation distributes regulatory authority to different territo-
rial levels (global, regional, national, sub-national and local) on a functional, hierarchical 
or path-dependent basis. Multilevel regulatory systems frequently induce an expansion 
and advancement of regulatory capacities at various levels (Thatcher/Coen 2008). They 
differ in the number of organizations involved, the degree of coordination between reg-
ulatory actors, the influence of individual regulatory actors on regulation, and the con-
centration of influence to specific actors (Mathieu et al. 2016). The EU is a paradigmatic 
example of international multilevel regulation. 
The Notions of Regulation and Self-Regulation in Political Science 
66 
5 How does regulation take place? 
Black (2002) exemplifies how regulatory techniques evolved as the understanding of 
regulation widened. These developments were paralleled by a critique of the state-cen-
tered variant of regulation, especially its high costs, the lacking expertise of the state, 
and the danger of regulatory capture, when regulatory pursue their own rather than of 
public interests (Boddewyn 1985; Black 2002; Knill/Tosun 2012). The notions of respon-
sive, better or smart regulation all aim at a variety of improvements, such as regulatory 
impact assessments, simplification programs, methods to foster market-based alterna-
tives to traditional regulation, techniques for the choice of regulatory instruments, con-
sultation standards, risk-based approaches to enforcement and inspections, and an ex-
post evaluation of regulations (Radaelli/Meuweuse 2009). At least in theory, new meth-
ods of regulation should be more evidence-based, transparent, efficient, flexible, cost-
saving and involve open consultations (Ayres/Braithwaite 1992; Gunningham et al. 
1998; Kerwer 2005). 
5.1 Regulatory styles, instruments, and practices 
In the state-centered understanding, regulation directly achieves a behavioral change of 
regulatees by means of legally binding measures (Knill/Tosun 2012). Regulation is based 
on legal / bureaucratic rules and monitoring and enforcement measures such as inspec-
tions, performance and technical requirements, and sanctions (Black 2002). As this un-
derstanding views regulation as a continuous act or monitoring, enacting, evaluating and 
iŵpƌoǀiŶg ƌules, the ͞hoǁ͟, iŶ the seŶse of ͞the aƌt of goǀeƌŶiŶg͟ is given special atten-
tion (Coen/Thatcher 2005; Gilardi 2008). 
 For example, different regulatory styles can be identified (Dunlop 2000). Vogel 
(1986) distinguishes relations between regulatory actors that can be consensual or con-
flictual, pragmatic or legalistic, and more or less transparent. Löfstedt and Vogel (2001) 
identify four national styles of risk regulation (see also Renn 2001). With a confronta-
tional style, regulatory proposals are evaluated by scientists and the public, and the 
most scientifically sound proposal is chosen. The fiduciary approach roots in trust in a 
system of decision-making that is in the hands of elites, where procedural rules are 
largely absent. A consensual style is marked by flexible decision-making behind closed 
doors. Finally, a corporatist style relies on strengthening trust in the decision-making 
process by involving interest groups and experts in the drafting and selection of regula-
tory proposals (Knill/Tosun 2012). Knill and Lenschow (2003) further distinguish four 
modes of regulation in the context of the EU. Forms of intervention can grant more or 
less discretion and rely on binding or voluntary measures. Furthermore, steering mech-
anisms can be based on coercion, incentives or learning processes. 
 Regulatory instruments vary along several dimensions that enable the systematic 
comparative study of regulatory change and effectiveness (Bauer/Knill 2014; Knill et al. 
2009, 2012; Schaffrin et al. 2015; Thomann 2015a). The formal dimension of regulatory 
density depicts the amount, degree of detail and differentiation of regulation. The con-
tent of regulations then displays differing degrees of substantial and formal intensity. 
Substantial intensity refers to regulatory restrictiveness in terms of temporal, personal 
and substantive scope. Formal intensity denotes factors influencing the consequentiality 
of non-compliant behavior; monitoring, control and enforcement mechanisms. Along 
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these lines, Adam et al. (2015) sketch four styles of regulation. A style of lenient author-
ity entails narrow behavioral boundaries, but a low consequentiality of non-compliant 
behavior, while the latter is high with a style of authority. In turn, a permissive style of 
regulation prevails when the behavioral boundaries are wide and non-compliance has 
few consequences; whereas a style of punitive permissiveness entails more severe con-
sequences of non-compliance. 
 There is considerably less systematic knowledge about the processes in which imple-
menting and enforcing actors put regulation into (typically discretionary) practice 
(Knill/Tosun 2012; Lipsky 1980/2010; Thomann 2015a; Tosun 2012). Deviations from the 
ƌegulatioŶs ͞oŶ papeƌ͟, ǁhile tǇpiĐallǇ uŶaǀoidaďle, aƌe a fuŶĐtioŶ of Đleaƌ aŶd uŶaŵ-
biguous rules and organizational arrangements, but also of the personal perceptions, 
attitudes and enforcement styles of implementing actors, such as inspectors 
(May/Wood 2003; Thomann 2015b). In this respect, the literature on relational or re-
sponsive regulation emphasizes how regulation in practice is characterized by social in-
teractions, ambiguity and human factors (Ayres/Braithwaite 1992; Carter 2017; Etienne 
2013; Huising/Silbey 2011; Pires 2011; Rutz et al. 2015). This points to the usefulness of 
a widened procedural understanding of regulation, encompassing norms and mecha-
nisms of social control, even if the focus remains on state actors. 
 In the second meaning of regulation as governance, the ͞ hoǁ͟ ƋuestioŶ is asked ǁith 
a focus on binding or hybrid steering instruments, called regulation by directives, as also 
practiced above the state within, for example, the EU or the World Trade Organization 
(Braithwaite/Drahos 2000; Ewert/Maggetti 2016; Genschel/Plumper 1997; Zürn 1998). 
This meant an extension with quasi- and non-legal, procedural and meta-regulating rules 
as well as financial, market- or information-based instruments. Examples include incen-
tive structures, international tradeable permit systems, disclosure requirements, taxes, 
subsidies, public procurement policies, competitive tendering for licenses, franchises or 
other benefits, as well as persuasive techniques such as information or education (Black 
2002). 
5.2 Voluntary regulation 
With the transition to the third, broad meaning of regulation, the regulatory toolkit was 
widened to further include unilateral rules, trust, social interactions, structuring, ena-
bling, coordinating, ordering, communication and even technology (Black 2002). Here 
and especially at the transnational, global level, voluntary mechanisms of regulation are 
often employed. This can entail soft law, such as recommendations of good practice, 
voluntary agreements, transparency standards and certification schemes (regulation by 
standards; Büthe 2010; Gunningham et al. 1998; Levi-Faur 2011b; Prakash/Potoski 
2007). The often surprisingly high effectiveness of such techniques is not least due to 
the lacking political acceptance of centralized regulatory authority at the global level 
(Büthe 2010). 
 Voluntary modes of regulation are characterized by the absence of binding rules, 
enforcement mechanisms (e.g. courts) and – often, but not always – state actors. Inde-
pendently of who regulates, the development and application of rules takes place on a 
voluntary, non-binding basis (Pratash/Potoski 2007). Compliance with soft law hence 
depends on the voluntary participation, resource allocation and consensus of govern-
ments and / or corporations (Vogel 2008). Such approaches can not only be found at the 
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international level, and they are not even necessarily a new phenomenon. Typically, 
their evolvement and functioning depends on a shadow of either hierarchy or the mar-
ket (Börzel/Risse 2010; Töller 2011). The shadow of the state refers to the threat of state 
intervention by means of legislation, controls, positive incentives or enforcement if vol-
untary regulation fails to take place. It can also mean that governments issue voluntary 
programs or plaǇ the ƌole of a ͞ŵidǁife͟ (Héritier/Eckert 2008, 2009). 
 Kerwer (2005) mentions four forms of voluntary standards. Private standardization 
means that non-state actors (firms, watchdogs) relatively unilaterally set standards that 
address all the concerned regulatees. Whether or not the standard is ultimately adopted 
by the later depends on its usage and hence, on the market, information intermediaries 
and legal processes. One instance of this are the non-smoking standards of the Interna-
tional Air Transport Association. Committee standardizing occurs via transnational, tech-
nocratic committees composed of government actors, private lobbyists and consultants. 
These standards are primarily directed toward the public administration in order to co-
ordinate international standardization. They are enforced by means of peer review and 
market pressure (Slaughter 2009). The International Standard Banking Practices of the 
banking commission of the international chamber of commerce are an illustrative ex-
ample. Transnational network standardizing changes the logic of rulemaking: here, 
standards are set jointly by public and private local actors in a process of self-regulation. 
Transnational networks coordinate and supervise this process using certain criteria. Fi-
nally, organizational standardizing happens, for instance, in the OECD, whose members 
first negotiate standards that are compulsory for its members and then enforce these 
standards at the national level. 
5.3 Self-regulation 
Last but not least, self-regulation refers to a subset of regulation that is intended as an 
alternative to both state and market (Kerwer 2005; Sinclair 1997; Töller 2011). Porter 
and Ronit (2006: 43) define as self-ƌegulatioŶ ͞aŶ aƌƌaŶgeŵeŶt, iŶǀolǀiŶg foƌŵal oƌ iŶ-
formal procedures, rules and norms, that is widely recognized as having the purpose of 
constraining the conduct of a set of private actors, where the procedures, rules and 
norms are shaped to a significant degree by some or all of these actors͟. Self-regulation 
is often wrongly equated with private, hybrid or voluntary regulation (Kerwer 2005; Sin-
clair 1997; Töller 2011). While self-regulation is typically private, not all modes of private 
regulation constitute self-regulation. Whereas self-regulation has pronouncedly hybrid 
aspects as concerns overlapping regulatory roles and the involvement of diverse actors 
(Black 2002; Töller 2009), clearly, not all forms of hybrid regulation refer to self-regula-
tion (Parker 2002, 2007). Also, not all forms of self-regulation are truly voluntary. The 
defining element of self-regulation is not that it is non-binding, but that the regulator 
and the regulatee are largely identical – which is also the case, for example, for the 
highly binding codes of medical ethics (Black 1996, 2002). 
 Self-regulation often requires a shadow of hierarchy: effective self-regulation implies 
that it is iŶ the iŶdustƌǇ͛s self-interest. This in turn can be influenced by the state. How-
ever, the state either plays a subordinate, supporting or parallel role (Boddewyn 1985; 
Héritier/Eckert 2008, 2009). The fight against doping, for instance, unfolds in coexist-
ence of the private International Olympic Committee and the World Anti-Doping 
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Agency, an independent regulatory agency. Newman and Bach (2004) differentiate be-
tween legalistic self-regulation in the United States, based on the threat of formal regu-
lation, and the coordinated self-regulation in Europe, where public and industry propo-
nents meet as partners and reach an agreement. 
 Self-regulation can be observed along all the regulatory processes ranging from 
agenda setting to evaluation. Often, state actors are consciously left out from the dis-
course of agenda-setting and problem definition. New problems are tackled by modify-
ing or diffusing existing rules. The implementation and enforcement of self-regulation 
often relies on persuasion, social interaction of appeals to self-interest, which come into 
effect through either peer pressure or market pressure. Examples range from the online 
publication of recommendations over naming and shaming to complex certification pro-
cesses. Such measures are complemented with incentives and sanctions that increase 
compliance. A first means to this end consists of increasing the value to regulated actors 
of being members in good standing in the self-regulatory arrangement (reputation, ac-
cess to crucial information). Second, the leverage that can be applied against non-com-
plying actors by private-sector actors outside the self-regulatory arrangement can be 
increased: the costs of non-membership and con-compliance can be raised, for example, 
when appliance manufacturers only accept parts that have a certain certificate. Third 
self-regulation can be backed up with public-sector enforcement. For example, a coun-
try may allow only those firms to operate on its territory that are members of a certain 
self-regulatory arrangement. Here, consumer organizations can play an important role. 
The evaluation of such arrangements typically takes place in an unsystematic, descrip-
tive and ad hoc manner (e.g. annual reports), if at all (Porter/Ronit 2006). 
 Boddewyn (1985: 135) pinpoints four main types of self-regulation. In pure self-reg-
ulation, norms are developed, used, and enforced by the industry itself. Informal con-
sultations with outside actors are possible, but not their formal involvement into deci-
sion-making. Co-opted self-regulation entails that the industry, on its own volition, in-
volves non-industry people (e.g. consumer and government representatives, independ-
ent members of the public, experts) in the development, application, and enforcement 
of norms, hence internalizing these outsiders. In negotiated self-regulation, the industry 
voluntarily negotiates the development, use, and enforcement of norms with some out-
side body (e.g. a government department or a consumer association); outsiders remain 
outside. Finally, mandated self-regulation is equivalent to Levi-Fauƌ͛s ;ϮϬϭϭͿ eŶfoƌĐed 
self-regulation: An industry is ordered or designated by the government to develop, use 
and enforce norms – either alone, or in concert with other bodies. In its most extreme 
form, non-state actors are merely asked for their consent to predefined rules (Por-
ter/Ronit 2006). Black (1996) adds sanctioned self-regulation to this list, in which the 
collective group itself formulates the regulation, which is then subjected to government 
approval. Additionally, in coerced self-regulation, the industry itself formulates and im-
poses regulation in response to threats by the government to impose statutory regula-
tion. Next to their degree of obligation, self-regulatory regimes differ in terms of indus-
try structure, costs and benefits, technological solutions, prevailing business culture, 
and assimilative capacities (Sinclair 1997). 
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6 Discussion 
This essay has highlighted the divergent notions of regulation in Political Science, differ-
ing in their state-centeredness and their relative emphasis on regulation as an instru-
ment or a process, respectively. On the one hand, varieties of regulation and self-regu-
lation are central for understanding new modes of governance beyond the borders of 
the traditional nation state, whose relevance has long exceeded the realm of adminis-
trative sciences (Koppell 2010). Simultaneously, it captures the eye that amidst the 
plethora of existing taxonomies, a more integrative approach is still lacking (see however 
Knill/Lehmkuhl 2002). Eventually, different typologies of regulation should be assessed 
according to their analytic and empirical usefulness. 
 On the one hand, the state-centered focus on instruments offers a tangible, meas-
urable concept of regulation that enables concrete analyses of the change and effective-
ness of regulations. However, this understanding arguably becomes increasingly obso-
lete because it tends to focus on public regulators and problem definitions that are con-
fined to national territories (Koppell 2010). As a consequence, this notion of regulation 
is unnecessarily self-limiting and neglects more arbitrary forms of control, economic and 
civil regulation and voluntary mechanisms (Levi-Faur 2011a: 5–6). On the other hand, 
the newer, less state-centered notions do understand regulation as a response to in-
creasingly complex and transboundary policy problems that integrate a multiplicity of 
actors into decision-making processes of varying legitimacy. However, by focusing on 
power relations and accountability mechanisms, they also tend to neglect the actual 
regulatory instruments and implementation processes both conceptually and empiri-
cally. The enormous range of existing notions of regulation comes at the cost of the 
possibility to grasp the phenomenon conceptually and get to a clear operationalization 
hat could form the basis for cumulative research. 
 From a policy-analytical perspective, if we understand regulation as a response to 
new policy problems, then political scientists arguably have the duty to identify the ac-
tual problem-solving capacity of different regulatory regimes (Scharpf 1997). Overall, 
however, the practical implementation of regulation and its effectiveness remain nota-
bly under-researched, especially in its global, private, and voluntary variants (Dunlop et 
al. 2012; Radaelli/Meuweuse 2009; Vogel 2008). The question of regulatory effective-
ness and impact is particularly burning when it comes to private and self-regulation. 
Very little is known about the conditions under which regulatees stick to rules that are 
not set and enforced by the state (Büthe 2010). Hybridized regulatory arrangements can 
entail systematically conflicting interests and accountabilities, with observable negative 
consequences for goal achievement (Lytton/McAllister 2014; Sager et al. 2014; 
Thomann/Sager 2017). The current state of research suggests that the delegation of reg-
ulatory tasks often does not live up to its promise. To the contrary: as the involvement 
of state actors decreases, delegation yields worse outcomes than public regulation 
(Overman 2016). In other words, it is still unclear how the regulatory state can fulfil its 
responsibility to safeguard the public interest. For a better understanding of the mech-
anisms underlying these findings, both formal regulatory instruments and arrangements 
and social processes deserve attention. 
 The literature overview presented here has also illustrated that it is often difficult to 
clearly differentiate the various notions of regulation. The question arises how produc-
tive such a demarcation actually is. Most often, it arguably makes more sense to speak 
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of a differentiation and diversification of public and non-state forms of regulation, rather 
than their substitution. What is more, different steering mechanisms often necessitate 
each other. The relative importance of alternative steering modes also varies depending 
on the specific policy sector and the regulatory demands it imposes (Knill/Tosun 2012). 
Hence, policy analysis needs more analytic approaches that set the different regulatory 
processes – from agenda-setting to evaluation – in relation and integrate both the in-
volved actors and the instruments at disposal. Thereby, it is important to consider the 
implications of the subject matter for the technical, political and institutional context in 
which regulation occurs (Lowi 1972). To this end, the regulation literature could not only 
benefit from moving beyond continued attempts at classification and conceptual clarifi-
cation, but also from making more use of insights from neighboring fields along all stages 
of the regulatory cycle. 
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